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Abstract 
The relationship between labour law and informal norms in the governance of working 
relationships is underexplored terrain. While notable exceptions exist, they have thus far tended to 
focus on the prioritisation of informal norms either in the absence or at the expense of labour law. 
This article contributes to the debate by empirically examining the interaction and associated 
impact of norms and law in one UK-based sector, agriculture.  
 
Drawing on qualitative interviews with farming employers and workers, informal norms are 
compared to three statutory laws on wage-related benefits – pensions, apprenticeship rates and 
accommodation. In each of these cases, the informal norm appeared to offer more potential 
protection to the workers than the legislative provision. The reason for this lies in the different 
constructions of ‘value’ in the law and the informal norm.  
 
I. Introduction 
Working relationships are regulated by the interaction of legal and non-legal norms and yet the 
two have often been treated as distinct in the scholarship of different disciplines.2 While socio-
legal, pluralist and regulatory studies of law have begun to investigate the links between law and 
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2 Andrew Frazer, ‘Labour law, institutionalist regulation and the employing organization’ (2014) 201(1) International 
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informal norms, often they focus on the effectiveness of law; its acceptability, contingency and 
legitimacy in the world it seeks to regulate.3 Particular institutionalist accounts4 have sought to 
reconceptualise the relationship between law and norms, recognising that law is affected by 
embedded organisational norms. However, it is the law in these studies which often provides the 
dominant frame of analysis: how norms affect legal compliance or are invoked in law’s absence. 
Far less is known about how law and informal norms interact within working relationships5 and 
the subsequent impact on workers when norms are either successfully displaced by law or not. 
This paper thus addresses these research questions through empirical examination of the interplay 
between informal norms and three statutory, wage-related laws in one UK-based sector: 
agriculture. It finds that the interplay is nuanced, with law’s displacement of norms not necessarily 
leading to better worker protection.  
 
Described as ‘an interesting enigma’,6 agriculture is a traditionalist industry guided by its own 
internal principles and rules. Externally, ‘a number of factors differentiate farming employment 
relations from the remainder of the economy’,7 not least the seasonality and perishability of the 
produce and a tight supply chain which controls farm operations. Indeed, until 2013, the UK had 
a separate regime of enhanced employment law rights for agricultural workers in recognition of 
                                                          
3 Ibid 10.  
4 E.g. Richard W Scott, ‘Crafting an Analytic Framework I: Three Pillars of Institutions’ in Institutions and 
Organizations (2013, Sage Publishing); Frazer (n 2) 16. 
5 Petra Mahy, Richard Mitchell, Sean Cooney and John Howe, ‘The Plural Regulation of Work: A pilot study of 
restaurant workers in Yogyakarta, Indonesia’ (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 2017) 15 
<https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/2475259/Plural-Regulation-of-Work-Pilot-Study-of-
Restaurant-Workers-Yogyakarta-ISBN-9780734053916-online.pdf> accessed 9 April 2019. 
6 Jane L. Glover and Trish Reay, ‘Sustaining the Family Business with Minimal Financial Rewards: How do family 
farms continue?’ (2015) 28(2) Family Business Review 163, 163. 
7 Rupert Tipples, ‘The further re-regulation of farming employment relations in New Zealand’ (2007) 47(1) Sociologia 
Ruralis 63, 67. 
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the uniqueness of the sector.8 This was abolished in England in 2013,9 leaving those employed 
after 31 October 2013 within the generic legislative framework. Internally, the involvement of 
family members and emotional attachment to the farm complicate rationality within the decision-
making process, not least as farming is often ‘viewed as a lifestyle, or a way of life.’10  As a result, 
I anticipated that working relationships within the sector would be regulated by several informal 
norms which would likely resist law’s formalised system. 
 
I focus on three wage-related statutory provisions, namely pensions, accommodation and 
apprentice pay, to allow deeper consideration of law’s connection to informal norms. As they are 
prescriptive provisions, the legal rules contain little discretion regarding their application. As such, 
compliance with the law is binary, leaving scope for considering whether deviant behaviour is 
actually compliance with an informal norm. In addition, these laws govern areas of norm behaviour 
which have recently changed, allowing reflection on the impact for workers when law displaces 
norms. In doing so, my approach builds on the recent empirical turn in labour law,11 which explores 
‘how the law is used: not simply whether it achieves its objectives (however defined) but how 
people come to accommodate and live with it’.12 
                                                          
8 Agricultural Wages Act 1948; Agricultural Wages (England and Wales) Order 2012. 
9 By the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s.73 and Schedule 20. Wales has retained the regime: Agricultural 
Wages (Wales) Order 2019. 
10 Linda Price and Nick Evans, ‘From ‘As Good as Gold to ‘Gold Diggers’: Farming Women and the Survival of 
British Family Farming’ (2006) 46(4) Sociologia Ruralis 280, 283; Mieke Calus and Guido Van Huylenbroeck, ‘The 
Persistence of Family Farming: A Review of Explanatory Socio-economic and Historical Factors’ (2010) 41(5) 
Journal of Comparative Family Studies 639. 
11 Amy Ludlow and Alysia Blackham (eds.) New frontiers in empirical labour law research (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2015); Jeremias Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015); Lizzie Barmes, 
Bullying and Behavioural Conflict at Work: The Duality of Individual Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015); 
Lydia Hayes, Stories of Care: A Labour of Law (Palgrave MacMillan Publishing, 2017). 
12  Linda Dickens and Mark Hall, ‘Review into research into the impact of employment relations legislation’ 
(Employment Relations Research Series No 45, DTI, 2005) 32. 
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This article is set out in four parts. I begin by reviewing the literature on the relationship between 
law and informal norms drawn from the law-and-economics movement, socio-legal literature on 
compliance and empirical studies on the operation of informal norms in UK working relationships. 
I then introduce the research background and design before presenting my empirical findings in 
three sections which focus on norm construction; norms as additional benefits; norms as aligned 
to other industry norms; and norms as being more protective than law. Each section discusses the 
interplay between informal norms and law before concluding that the norm appears to be preferred 
by relevant actors to the law because of its increased protection and the value it affords to labour. 
 
II. The relationship between law and norms  
Workplaces are ‘a hotbed for norm-bedded action’.13 Ranging from understanding the impact of 
gender norms, recognising a workers’ code of honour or assessing a disinclination to discuss 
wages,14 research has established a multiplicity of norms which operate alongside formal structures 
and rules within organisations. Interest in the interplay between law and norms boomed in the mid-
1990s when scholars of the law-and-economics movement embraced a new wave of norm 
scholarship.15 The movement recognised that ‘a law is an obligation backed by a state sanction… 
a norm can be defined as an obligation backed by a nonlegal sanction.’16 Those non-legal sanctions 
                                                          
13 Jon Elster, ‘Social Norm and Economic Theory’ (1989) 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives 99, 101. 
14 Leonard Bierman and Rafael Gely, ‘Love, Sex and Politics - Sure - Salary - No Way: Workplace Social Norms and 
the Law’ (2004) 25(1) Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labour Law 167, 175. 
15 Robert C. Ellickson, ‘The Evolution of Social Norms: A perspective from the legal Academy’ in Michael Hechter, 
Karl-Dieter Opp (ed.) Social Norms (Russell Sage Foundation, 2001) 35. 
16 Robert Cooter, ‘Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens: An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms’ (2000) 86 
Virginia Law Review 1577, 1579-80. 
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can include a variety of social punishments, from ostracism to gossip.17 As a result, where law 
cannot provide enough sanctions or incentives to encourage behaviour towards a perceived public 
good, norms may provide the constructive role in encouraging behaviour.18 
 
Rational choice theory is often utilised by law-and-economics scholars, who view behaviour as 
motivated rationally and by self-interest,19 such that decisions are taken on an implicit cost-benefit 
analysis. Thus, one of the movement’s most well-known proponents, Eric Posner, considers  the 
horizontal interplay between law and behaviour to be ‘signalling equilibria’,20 in which individuals 
comply with laws to seek reputational gain or protection. In his case of tax compliance, most 
people would not voluntarily pay tax under the traditional rational wealth maximiser position 
because it does not serve their financial interests;21 consequently tax is supported by penalties for 
evasion. However, Posner argued that when penalties are too high, compliance can be undermined 
as it removes the ability to voluntarily honour tax obligations and thus reduces the chance to 
‘signal’ a willingness to establish cooperative relationships.22 A social norm is therefore a label 
and, Posner claims, ‘has no independent explanatory power.’23 Norms may therefore be managed 
by lawmakers to encourage preferential behaviour, with social meaning created and sustained by 
                                                          
17 Ellickson (n 15) 35-6. 
18 Dan M. Kahan, ‘Signaling or Reciprocating - A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms’ (2002) 36 
University of Richmond Law Review 367, 367-8. 
19 Sally S. Simpson and Melissa Rorie, ‘Motivating Compliance: Economic and Material Motives for Compliance’ in 
Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen (eds), Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation 
(Edward Elgar Publishing [online] 2011) 60. 
20 Eric A. Posner, 'Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 1781, 1819. 
21 Kahan (n 18) 376-377. 
22 Ibid 378. 
23 Posner (n 20) 1819. 
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law.24 While Posner’s theory is a sophisticated analysis which explains repeated behaviour beyond 
the profit maximisation model, his conceptualisation fails to adequately explain empirical 
behaviour, or as Kahan argues, it is behaviourally unrealistic.25 One of Posner’s core problems, as 
for other rational choice theorists, is his attempt to model such a broad spectrum of behaviour that 
nearly any phenomenon can be negated or accounted for.26 In addition, Posner’s theory fails to 
recognise the complexity within the interplay between law and norms, not least through his denial 
of norms’ causative effects. As a result, the relationship between norms and law can be understood 
as being more unpredictable than Posner suggests.  
 
A. The preference of norms over law 
Much of the early work on the relationship between law and norms focused on the role of norms 
at the expense of law.27 For instance, Stewart Macaulay’s classic study into US businessmen and 
lawyers found that contract law was routinely ignored in business transactions.28 Instead, informal 
norms exerted more of an influence on behaviour than legal regulation. Likewise, in Lisa 
Bernstein’s research into the American merchant trade, two types of informal norms were 
preferred to laws to manage relationships: relationship-preserving (‘RPNs’) and ‘end of game’ 
norms (‘EGNs’). RPNs included dispute-resolution and performance-based norms and focused on 
upholding the relationship between actors, whilst EGNs were chosen at the end of the relationship 
                                                          
24 Emanuela Carbonara, ‘Law and Social Norms’ in  Francesco Parisi (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and 
Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2017) 473. 
25 Kahan (n 18) 375, 385. 
26 Ibid 371-372. 
27 Bierman and Gely (n 14) 173-174. 
28 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28(1) American 
Sociological Review 55, 63. 
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and were included in the legal contract.29 Preference for RPNs centred on the need for flexibility. 
Thus, RPNs were ‘deliberately allocated to the extralegal realm’30 because they relied on 
observable but not verifiable information, or the cost of formalising the obligation was too high. 
RPNs also reflected adjustments to which parties did not want to be bound or which were made 
solely to preserve a profitable relationship. Social sanctions were also often more effective than 
legal sanctions.31 Transactors thus implicitly distinguished between these norms, choosing the one 
most appropriate for their contracting stage and relationship;32 the law was not the a priori guiding 
force. 
 
Other, more recent empirical research, has noted the continuing role that norms play within 
working relationships, particularly in smaller, or family-run firms, where rules are often unwritten 
and principles tacitly understood.33 Jordan et al’s study into employers’ perceptions of labour 
legislation noted that amongst small firms, ‘the norm was to operate “like a family”, which was at 
odds with developing formal practices.’34 Instead, practices were characterised by the daily 
routines between employees and managers,35 with formal rights flexibly interpreted to meet the 
                                                          
29 Lisa Bernstein, ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms’ 
(1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765, 1796-7. 
30 Ibid 1797. 
31 Ibid 1798. 
32 Ibid 1797-8. 
33 Monder Ram, Paul Edwards, Mark Gilman and James Arrowsmith, ‘The Dynamics of Informality: Employment 
Relations in Small Firms and the Effects of Regulatory Change’ (2001) 15(4) Work, Employment & Society 845, 846; 
James Arrowsmith, Mark W. Gilman, Paul Edwards and Monder Ram, ‘The Impact of the National Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms’ (2003) 41(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 435, 438-9, 451-2. 
34 Elizabeth Jordan, Andrew Thomas, John Kitching, Robert A. Blackburn, Employment Regulation. Part A: Employer 
Perceptions and the Impact of Employment Regulation (Business, Innovation & Skills, Employment Relations 
Research Series No. 123, March 2013) 34; Brigitte Kroon and Jaap Paauwe, ‘Structuration of precarious employment 
in economically constrained firms: the case of Dutch agriculture’ (2014) (1) Human Resources Management Journal 
19, 32. 
35 Kroon and Paauwe (n 34) 32. 
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business context.36 As a result, informal norms retain a crucial importance in working 
relationships, often at the expense of law. 
 
B. The role of norms when law is weak 
The relationship between informal norms and law has also been considered by socio-legal scholars 
when analysing compliance. While the formal construct of compliance compares the formal 
definition of legal obligations to the actual behaviour of the regulated,37 socio-legal literature has 
suggested that, alternatively, compliance should be considered as ‘the negotiated outcome of the 
regulatory encounter’,38 or as ‘a process of extended and endless negotiation’.39 Consequently, 
failure to comply with law may actually signal compliance with a sub-culture’s norms.40 As a 
result, the relationship between norms and law is dynamic, and ‘informal norms and institutions 
often play complementary or even substitutive roles when formal regulation is absent or ignored’.41  
 
One of the leading theorists on this topic, Lauren B. Edelman, examines the role of employment 
law when law is ambiguous, procedural in its emphasis or has weak enforcement mechanisms.42 
In her view, the issue is weakness within the legal regime, which allows law to be constructed ‘in 
                                                          
36 Dickens and Hall (n 12) 350. 
37  Bettina Lange, ‘Compliance Construction in the Context of Environmental Regulation’ (1999) 8(4) Social & Legal 
Studies 549, 552. 
38 Robyn Fairman and Charlotte Yapp, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance 
within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2005) 27(4) Law & Policy 491, 491, 495. 
39 Peter K. Manning, ‘Reviewed Work(s): To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety by John 
Braithwaite’ (1988) 28(4) The British Journal of Criminology 559, 561. 
40 Lange (n 37) 564. 
41 Petra Mahy, ‘The functional approach in comparative socio-legal research: reflections based on a study of plural 
work regulation in Australia and Indonesia’ (2016) International Journal of Law in Context 420, 421. 
42 Lauren B. Edelman, ‘Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law’ 
(1992) 97(6) American Journal of Sociology 1531, 1532. 
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a manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo’.43 Her theory of legal endogeneity 
highlights that the creation of formal structures can appear as visible mechanisms for implementing 
legal rules, which can often serve as merely a symbolic commitment to legislative compliance.44 
Indeed, she finds that the symbolic value of commitment to law motivated organisations ‘even in 
the absence of any rational motivation for doing so’.45 Crucially, those conceptualisations – 
imbued with meaning from organisational norms and institutionalised by courts’ interpretations – 
become entrenched within the law’s legitimacy.46 Conflict between norms and laws are thus 
balanced, with external legitimacy provided by these gestures of compliance, mediated by 
individual managerial discretion.47  
 
Fundamental to Edelman’s discussion is the role of the ambiguity of law and legal processes, 
providing the space within which norms can be prioritised over law within the operation of the law 
itself. Employment law does ‘tend to set forth broad and ambiguous principles that give 
organizations wide latitude to construct the meaning of compliance’.48 However other rules, such 
as the statutory wage-related benefits under discussion here are far more prescriptive. There is thus 
scope for further inquiry into the interplay between norms and these statutory rules.  
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Ibid 1535. 
44 Ibid 1544. 
45 Ibid 1545. 
46 Ibid 1546-1547. 
47 Ibid 1567. 
48 Ibid 1532. 
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C. The role of norms when new law is introduced  
Law can sometimes displace informal norms; however legal rules which are substantially different 
to a prevailing norm require gradual introduction to allow adaptation.49 If not, or when the legal 
rules pursue different objectives to the norm, often the relationship breaks down, with the informal 
norm emerging the victor. 50 For example, when the UK’s National Minimum Wage (‘NMW’) Act 
was introduced in 1998, it created a generally applicable statutory wage law.51 Its introduction thus 
brought a challenge to embedded informal norms regarding pay. Ram et al noted an initial 
regulatory ‘shock’ amongst employers when the law was first enacted, both as to costs and 
increased administrative requirements.52 However, this shock was not seen as significant enough 
‘to jolt employers or workers out of their customary practices and habits’.53 This was because the 
shock was ‘absorbed by informal understandings’,54 with wages influenced by product market 
pressures, labour force characteristics and labour market institutions, as well as internal customary 
norms.55 According to Arrowsmith et al’s inquiry into the clothing, hotel and catering industries, 
the most common response to the NMW was to simply absorb the increase in costs.56 Employers 
also claimed that workers had requested lower wages to ensure they still received social security 
                                                          
49 Carbonara (n 24) 479. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Agriculture had its own statutory minimum wage: Agricultural Wages Act 1948 and associated Orders. 
52 Ram et al. (n 32) 847. 
53 Ibid 847;  Arrowsmith et al. (n 33) 451. 
54 Ibid 852; Ibid 452. 
55 Ibid 858-9; Ibid 452; Monder Ram, Paul Edwards and Trevor Jones, ‘Staying Underground Informal Work, Small 
Firms, and Employment Regulation in the United Kingdom’ (2007) 34(3) Work and Occupations 318, 336; Damien 
Grimshaw and Marilyn Carroll, ‘Adjusting to the national minimum wage: constraints and incentives to change in six 
low‐paying sectors’ (2006) 37(1) Industrial Relations Journal 22; Janet Druker, Geoffrey White and Celia Stanworth, 
‘Coping with Wage Regulation: Implementing the National Minimum Wage in Hairdressing Businesses’ (2005) 23(1) 
International Small Business Journal 5.  
56 Arrowsmith et al (n 33) 451; Ram et al (n 33) 847. 
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benefits.57 Interestingly, the workers interviewed by Arrowsmith et al varied on whether they 
viewed this was acceptable, depending on the fairness of pay, how they were treated and the 
relative pressure of the job.  Other employers responded to NMW as a ‘critical event’, where 
implementation triggered changes to working practices which had been under consideration. As 
such, the law’s introduction, whilst resulting in organisational change, was moulded by the 
informal norms of the workplace. The researchers concluded that ‘legal obligations will be ignored 
if they do not relate to the established set of informal norms.’58 Thus it is not only the quality of 
the law that may affect the relationship; the entrenchment of the norm itself is likely to be relevant. 
 
This brief review of the literature highlights that authors such as Bernstein have determined that 
norms are often preferred to law within working relationships, whilst theorists such as Posner and 
Edelman have sought to explain this interaction by reference to the law’s perceived inadequacy. 
In the next section, I build on this literature by demonstrating that the picture is more complicated 
when one examines the impact of the interaction between law and norms on working relationships 
in an agricultural setting. In doing so, I challenge the implicit assumption within existing 
scholarship that following norms over law tends to be detrimental to  workers, by suggesting that 
labour is valued more highly under prevailing normative standards than the current legislative 
framework. 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 Ibid 443. 
58 Ram et al (n 33) 367. 
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III. Background and methodology 
A. UK Agriculture  
Data was collected as part of a wider project on how UK-based small-sized livestock farmers 
responded to employment law. The project was set against a backdrop of significant uncertainty 
for the agricultural industry driven by a declining labour availability and increasing financial 
pressures, issues which frame this research. 
 
Since 2000 there has been a notable decline in regular, full-time hired labour in UK small farms, 
with a comparative increase in seasonal labour.59 However, the demand for workers is anticipated 
to rise over the next few years.60 Farmers are thus increasingly concerned about a sectoral labour 
shortage, a shortage which is exacerbated due to the declining availability of migrant workers 
following the Brexit referendum in 2016.61 Of all the agricultural workforce, migrant workers have 
received the most attention by researchers.62 This is unsurprising; agriculture has ‘high levels of 
seasonal, informal and migrant labour’,63 as the seasonal nature of the work positively lends itself 
                                                          
59 Michael Winter and Matt Lobley, Is there a future for the small family farm in the UK? Report to The Prince’s 
Countryside Fund (Prince’s Countryside Fund 2016) 47; Michel Blanc, Eric Cahuzac, Bernard Elyakime and Gabriel 
Tahar, ‘Demand for on-farm permanent hired labour on family holdings’ (2008) 35(4) European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 493, 494. 
60 Caroline Nye, ‘The ‘blind spot’ of agricultural research: Labour flexibility, composition and worker availability in 
the South West of England.’ (2018) 27(3) Cahiers Agricultures 35002. 
61 Environment, Food & Rural Affairs Committee, Feeding the nation: labour constraints (Seventh Report) (HC 2016-
17, HC1009, April 2017) 3. 
62 See, for example: Precision Prospecting, ‘Temporary Workers in UK agriculture and horticulture: A Study of 
Employment Practices in the Agriculture and Horticulture Industry and Co-Located Packhouse and Primary Food 
Processing Sectors’ (Precision Prospecting Ltd and University of Cambridge 2005); Ben Rogaly, ‘Intensification of 
Workplace Regimes in British Horticulture: The Role of Migrant Workers’ (2008) 14 Population, Space and Place 
497.  
63 Sonia McKay, Steve Jefferys, Anna Paraksevopoulou and Janoj Keles, Study on precarious work and social rights 
(Working Lives Research Institute, European Commission, April 2012) Appendix A:3; Bridget Anderson and Ben 
Rogaly, ‘Forced Labour and Migration to the UK’ (Centre for Migration, Policy and Society in collaboration with the 
Trades Union Congress 2005) 26.  
13 
 
to such a workforce.64 Taking account of this literature, this project does not analyse migrant 
workers as a distinct group, because its aim is to bridge a gap in understanding working 
relationships more broadly. There is also not the same differentiation of status between migrant 
and domestic workers on livestock farms; workers are treated similarly because animals need the 
same daily care year-round.  
 
In addition, financial pressures and declining margins have resulted in mass intensification in 
agricultural production, where priority is given to quality, volume and price.65 The UK 
Government’s cheap food policy has encouraged growth of the industry, promoting large-scale 
farm practices.66 Retailers have sought further intensified practices which demand more work for 
less pay,67 making it difficult for suppliers to pay living wages,68 whilst last-minute changes to 
orders and ever-shorter lead times increase pressures.69 These practices impact upon the 
entrepreneurial control of employers, and pose significant challenges to smaller farmers who may 
lack the resources to meet the demands. Indeed, Lobley et al spoke of an ‘agricultural treadmill’, 
where farmers have ‘to ‘run’ constantly to survive and ‘stand still’.70 Consequently, this research 
focused on smaller farms to explore the impact of these pressures, particularly as in smaller 
                                                          
64 Precision Prospecting (n 62) 31-2; David McCollum and Allan Findlay, Trends in A8 migration to the UK during 
the recession (2011) (Population Trends 145, Office for National Statistics, Autumn 2011); Andrew Geddes and Sam 
Scott, ‘UK Food Businesses’ Reliance on Low-Wage Migrant Labour: A Case of Choice or Constraint’ in Martin 
Ruhs and Bridget Anderson (eds), Who needs migrant workers? Labour shortages, immigration and public policy 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012). 
65 Rogaly (n 62) 500; Precision Prospecting (n 62) 42. 
66 Winter and Lobley (n 59) 4. 
67 Rogaly (n 62) 497. 
68 Ethical Trading Initiative, ‘Company purchasing practices’ (Ethical Trading Initiative) 
<http://www.ethicaltrade.org/issues/company-purchasing-practices> accessed 20 November 2018. 
69 Precision Prospecting (n 61) 33. 
70 Matt Lobley, Michael Winter and Rebecca Wheeler, The Changing World of Farming in Brexit UK (Routledge 
Publishing 2018) 57. 
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businesses, relationships are usually more heavily embedded with informal norms.71 Classifying a 
farm as small, however, is not without its practical difficulties.72 As a result, farms were considered 
‘small’ when they self-identified as such; which meant owner-occupied or tenanted farms, not 
agribusinesses or large land owners. 
 
B. Research design 
I conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with 29 farmers/farm managers and 2 workers 
at 26 farms/farm estates, to generate rich data in a flexible format.73 The qualitative approach 
enabled a conversational style, which encouraged reflections on how participants viewed their 
world. Employers were the primary focus of this study to examine how they responded to 
employment law, in light of the industry’s pressures. Participants were predominantly recruited 
from the South West of England, through utilising personal contacts in the farming community 
and adopting a snowballing sampling method. Participants were primarily male, with five female, 
reflecting the wider trend that most farmers are male, albeit this sample had more women farmers 
than the 11% national average.74 Seven were aged between 30-39; five between 40-49; twelve 
between 50-59 and the remaining seven were over 60, again reflecting the wider demographic of 
the sector, where 25% of farms are staffed by over 55-year olds.75 All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed, with some selectively transcribed due to their length (3 hours+). Ethics approval 
                                                          
71 Monder Ram, Paul Edwards, Trevor Jones, Maria Villares-Varela, ‘From the informal economy to the meaning of 
informality: Developing theory on firms and their workers’ (2017) 37(7/8) International Journal of Sociology and 
Social Policy 361, 367; Ram et. al. (n 32) 846; Ram et al. (n 54) 322. 
72 Winter and Lobley (n 58) 10. 
73 Mats Alvesson, Interpreting Interviews (Sage Publications, London, 2011) 2. 
74 Calculated from: Richard Clegg, ‘EMP04: Employment by Occupation’ (Office of National Statistics, 11 September 
2018). 
75 Tom Blenkinsop, HC Deb 24 April 2013, vol 561 col 926. 
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was granted for this research prior to data collection and pseudonyms are used throughout to 
protect participants’ identities. 
 
Finally, identifying norms was a complicated task.76 While norms’ external aspects can be revealed 
empirically through tangible, observable behaviour,77 they may clash with internal norms as to 
what actors think ought to be done.78 Following the pattern-seeking approach adopted by Mahy et 
al,79 practices were considered an informal norm when they were expected or considered standard 
enough to be sufficiently replicated over interviews. Moreover, norms could be identified 
reflexively by the participants through a comparison between their own behaviour and the wider 
industry. The extracts presented here thus reflect the wider opinion inherent in the sample. 
 
IV. The norms 
In this section, I use extracts from interviews with farm owners and estate managers, to extend the 
literature in two important ways. First, I highlight the continuing role norms play in managing 
agricultural working relationships, which often appears more protective of workers than the legal 
provisions which seek to displace them. Secondly, I suggest that the reason for this difference lies 
in the respective constructions of ‘value’ entailed in legal and normative frameworks. 
 
A. Norm as an additional benefit 
                                                          
76 Mahy et al (n 5) 32. 
77 Reza Banakar, Normativity in Legal Sociology: Methodological Reflections on Law and Regulation in Late 
Modernity (Springer, 2015) 216; Mahy (n 41) 428. 
78 Mahy et al (n 5) 32. 
79 Ibid. 
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In agriculture many workers, including seasonal staff, live in accommodation tied to their jobs.80 
The law allows employers to deduct up to £7.55/day from pay as an offset against the national 
minimum/living wage (‘NM/LW’).81 This statutory maximum was intended to protect employees 
from excessive charges levied by employers.82 However, not one employer in this sample deducted 
an offset. Instead where accommodation was provided as part of the job, the norm was to provide 
it, and bills and council tax, free of charge, as shown by Paul: 
The lowest paid is Paula, she’s 20, she’s on 20 grand, um, and then you’ve got Phil 
on 22, Paddy on 23 and Peter on 28. Included in that is a free house, so they pay 
nothing for their house, council tax, electricity.            
       (Paul, dairy farm owner, aged 30-39) 
Paul provided housing to each of his workers including his migrant worker (Peter) and recently 
hired worker (Phil). The norm was constructed as an additional benefit to staff, irrespective of 
legal regulation or the worker’s position. As a result, the market rate was regarded by these farmers 
as forming part of the reward package for employment, with Sam highlighting the practical costs: 
When we gave him a house, I effectively gave him nearly a £7000 pay rise, y’know 
– I could get £7000 of rent on that property.   
   (Sam, livestockfarm owner, aged 50-59) 
                                                          
80 Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, ‘Consultation on the Future of the Agricultural Wages Board 
for England and Wales, and Agricultural Wages Committees and Agricultural Dwelling House Advisory Committees 
in England: Summary of Responses (Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, December 2012, revised 
February 2013) 7. 
81 National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 regs 9 and 16.  
82 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, ‘Low Pay Commission consultation on the accommodation offset’ 
(Low Pay Commission and Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 25 July 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/low-pay-commission-consultation-on-the-accommodation-offset> accessed 
9 April 2019. 
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By providing accommodation as part of the financial package, its value was constructed differently 
to the legal rule providing for deduction of an off-set. Consequently, some workers appeared in a 
better financial position under this norm than had the law been followed. Other farmers did not 
provide accommodation, but increased the wages to reflect the costs of living in their area: 
A house ‘round here to rent out is worth anywhere from 750 to 1200 pound a 
month, if you took that much money plus the council tax off an employee’s wages, 
they basically wouldn’t work for you.., if you paid them 30 odd grand a year, they’d 
go find their own house to live in.                   (Rob, dairy farm owner, aged 50-59) 
As in Ram et al,83 the law was ignored in preference of an established set of informal norms which 
viewed accommodation as part of workers’ financial package. Whilst not a legal obligation - the 
statutory offset only sets a maximum deduction – the norm is also not displaced. This is despite 
declining financial margins where, using a rational choice approach, it might be considered that 
providing accommodation leaves little benefit to employing farmers. 
 
One reason for this seems to be the declining availability of staff, as Rob said: ‘so many farmers 
think the only way they’ll get an employee is to offer a house.’ In many ways, this reflects Posner’s 
signalling theory, where in the context of a sectoral labour shortage, employers are signalling 
willingness to contract through providing housing. Furthermore as the norm provides a more 
protective dispensation to workers in valuing accommodation as a non-deductible benefit, the law 
is not necessarily needed to encourage social welfare.84 However, the norm of providing a house 
for free not only signals but has created an entrenched expectation amongst future workers. As 
                                                          
83 Ram et al. (n 33) 367. 
84 Carbonara (n 24) 473. 
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Rob continued, ‘farming’s dug its own hole on this one by offering accommodation’. Thus, 
contrary to Posner, the norm is a causative factor which continues to substantiate itself within the 
industry. It seems that in current structural conditions, the norm is too entrenched to be displaced 
by law and yet that appears positive for the workers concerned. 
 
The norm to provide accommodation also extended into providing it to long-term workers past 
their retirement, with additional financial support coming from the State pension: 
The presumption was that you get a house for life, which is a completely bizarre, 
concept in…. So, Terry’s father was in a house for life and I would imagine that 
there would be an expectation from Terry [Tom’s worker] that he would have one 
as well.                         (Tom, farm estate manager, aged 50-59) 
This norm operated to reflect the longevity of the relationship, with workers and their families 
remaining in the property, which had been attached to their job, until their death. However, there 
were outstanding issues to address, such as responsibility for repairs, as the following extract with 
Zak shows: 
Interviewer:  When he retires, will he lose the house? 
Zak:  No, that is his house…. he’ll have to pay market rent when he retires, but he 
can live there all the time and I think his wife can as well. So, we had this, we had 
another house in the village down the road and… they lived in the house for 30 
years and the real problem was, we got to the point where we, the tenant left and 
no work had been done in the house, because there’s no, well, there’s no reason 
why you would look after that house! [laughs] but then we got to the end of it and 
we had to spend, 40 grand on repairs. So it was a bit of an eye-opener thinking 
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well actually we should look after these estate staff, houses a bit better really. So 
yeah Zeke [Zak’s worker] will, he’s grown up and had all his children in that 
house, he’ll live there for, forever I think.   (Zak, farm estate manager, aged 30-39) 
This extract raises several points, not least that Zeke will be required to pay rent at a market rate 
and thus the relationship will transfer from an employment relationship to one of landlord and 
tenant on retirement. However, the rationale for this appeared to stem from Zak’s previous 
experience with a long-term tenant, who outlived expectations and consequently the property fell 
into disrepair. Importantly, however, there is recognition of Zeke’s emotional connection to the 
house which Zak prioritises as his intention to keep him in situ and continue the relationship, 
presumably for the benefit of the worker. As such, the norm developed into incorporating mutual 
responsibilities, for the worker to pay rent and the house to be kept in good condition. Crucially, 
the phrase deployed was ‘looking after’; reflecting a sense of value in the relationship which 
echoes Bernstein’s relationship-preserving norms.85 This research, however, extends Bernstein’s 
analysis by applying it to a relationship that changed. While the relationship was preserved, it was 
reframed, suggesting that RPNs relate to the individuals as well as the contractual context. Thus, 
Zak appeared to deliberately allocate a RPN to flexibly manage the new relationship, altering the 
terms in line with his perceptions of future profitability. In return, Zeke appears protected by 
retaining his home. The norm thus provided an additional benefit for both parties, valued beyond 
the legal contractual construction. 
 
 
                                                          
85 Bernstein (n 29) 1796-7. 
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B. Norms’ displacement by new law 
Since 2017, pensions must be offered as a matter of law, and this legislative change has begun 
displacing the house for life norm. All jobholders over 22 who earn over £10,000 per year are to 
be automatically enrolled into an employer’s pension scheme, although opt-outs (and -ins) are 
available.86 Employers’ duties have been staggered since 1 October 2012,87 and the 2017 review 
into its implementation concluded that ‘automatic enrolment was working’, as it ‘harnesses inertia’ 
by ensuring individuals are defaulted into the scheme.88 Opt-out rates were generally 9%, although 
this was higher at 10% and 12% for micro- and small businesses respectively.89 Exploratory 
research suggested that opt-outs may increase due to a lack of information on the scheme and a 
perceived lack of affordability, particularly for women.90 Targeted self-employment interventions 
were due to be tested, and potentially legislated for, in 2018 however this has not yet happened.91  
 
This new legal requirement interacts with the traditional norm of providing a house for life. As 
Tom pointed out, this may be a ‘bizarre’ concept, but it may also explain why 65% of agricultural 
workers had not enrolled in a pension by the end of 2017;92 the underlying embedded formal norm 
continued to affect compliance with the pension law. Yet there has been some alteration to 
expected practices, for instance: 
                                                          
86 Pensions Act 2008 ss.3, 7, 8. 
87 Employers’ Duties (Implementation) Regulations 2010 reg. 4. 
88 Department for Work & Pensions, Automatic Enrolment Review 2017: Maintaining the Momentum (Cm 9546, 
December 2017) 13. 
89 Ibid 29. 
90 Rajiv Prabhakar, ‘Why do people opt-out or not opt-out of automatic enrolment? A focus group study of automatic 
enrolment into a workplace pension in the United Kingdom’ (2017) 27(5) Journal of European Social Policy 447.  
91 Department for Work & Pensions (n 87) 16. 
92 Trade Union Congress, ‘Six in ten workers in hospitality and agriculture not paying into a pension’ (9 October 
2017) < https://www.tuc.org.uk/news/tuc-reveals-pension-blackspots > accessed 4th April 2019. 
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I sort of said to them “Look you can take it but we’re not going to pay it to you if 
you don’t take it, it’s something we’re being legally obliged to do, I wouldn’t do it 
if we, I didn’t have to.” But y’know it’s only fair that they obviously have a 
pension…                           (Paul) 
The law’s challenge to the norm has been accepted by some farmers, which seems more deliberate 
than the absorption of the rules reported when the NMW was introduced.93 As the rules were 
staggered, it may be that farmers could adapt to the pension provisions rendering displacement of 
the norm more likely.94 However, more pertinent is Paul’s use of the word ‘fair’. Several of the 
research participants recognised that the introduction of pensions meant alignment of agricultural 
employment with other industries. As such, agriculture’s informal norms were both displaced by 
the law and aligned with other industries. That shift enabled farmers to more readily accept the 
legal change as opposed to reduce it to a question of sanctioned legal compliance, again invoking 
farmers’ internal value of staff: 
I’m quite happy with it [pension enrolment] … I’m hopefully quite conscious that 
people do need to be looked after.            (John, dairy farm owner, aged 30-39) 
Thus, in a related extension to Ram et al95, as there was greater alignment of the law to the 
employer’s embedded practices and view of fairness, legal obligations were more readily accepted. 
However not all farmers valued pensions as an acceptable norm with some, such as David, 
                                                          
93 Ram et al, (n 33) 858-9; Arrowsmith et al (n 32) 452; Ram et al (n 55) 336; Damien Grimshaw and Marilyn Carroll, 
‘Adjusting to the national minimum wage: constraints and incentives to change in six low‐paying sectors’ (2006) 
37(1) Industrial Relations Journal 22; Janet Druker, Geoffrey White and Celia Stanworth, ‘Coping with Wage 
Regulation: Implementing the National Minimum Wage in Hairdressing Businesses’ (2005) 23(1) International Small 
Business Journal 5.  
94 Carbonara (n 24) 479. 
95 Ram et al. (n 33) 367. 
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encouraging workers to opt-out: 
I’m just going to get her to sign herself out of it.   
          (David, dairy farm owner, aged 40-49) 
The reasons for this were two-fold. First, was ‘the extra cost basically…they still want their top 
whack [wage] per hour and they want that on top.’ Pensions add around 8% to the wage bill, 
however it was the staff’s expectation of a higher salary that David appeared concerned with. The 
second reason concerned how he constructed his social identity as an employer, and his perceived 
relationship with the law and Government: ‘Why should we be… doing the State’s job of looking 
after folk?’ Accordingly, for David, the law will not displace his informal norm as the valuation 
of labour does not align.   
 
While there is clearly potential for workers to be disadvantaged in this situation, David’s worker 
had requested a reduction in hours because ‘she only wants to earn £8,000 a year and doesn’t want 
to pay tax!’ Likewise, as employees also contributed, some farmers reported their staff had 
requested the opt-out, particularly younger employees: 
To them, it just looks like you’re robbing money off them, going in their pension: 
“Well actually I wanted it that weekend coz I’m going out!!”      
              (Yohan, dairy farm owner, aged 30-39) 
The supposed variation from the law in this manner does not render displacement of the norm 
ineffective. Importantly the regulations allow for variation within legal behaviour, where deviance 
is legitimised through the inclusion of the opt-out. Thus, extending Edelman, there was a weakness 
in the law which allows compliant behaviour, even though the law was still successful in changing 
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behaviour. Therefore, as agriculture moves away from giving farmworkers ‘a house for life’, if 
opt-outs increase, many workers – particularly older workers – will be in a more precarious 
position than they were prior to these changes. Of course, with the decline in both permanent staff 
and potential housing stock, this practice may well have declined naturally in the future. However, 
the embedded norm, compared to the statutory provision, seems to leave many workers more 
protected. 
 
C. The norm as more protective than the law 
The final legal provision to be discussed concerns apprenticeship pay. Apprenticeships are paid 
employment in a skilled occupation, which incorporates an element of substantial training for a 
minimum of 12 months.96 In 2015, the programme underwent a package of reforms to be more 
employer-led, to make apprenticeships more attractive and ‘a credible alternative to both higher 
education and jobs without training’.97 As part of this reform, the UK Government increased the 
rate by 21%, considerably more than the Low Pay Commission’s recommendation of a 2.6% 
increase.98 While the Government recognised concerns over non-compliance with rates, and the 
potential increases deterring employers’ from engaging with the scheme, it felt that this ‘largest 
ever increase’ would improve the quality of the programme and applicants.99 The 2019 rate is 
£3.90 and applies to those under 19 years of age, or in their first year; those over 19 and in their 
second year are entitled to their age-graded national minimum wage. 
                                                          
96 HM Government, The Future of Apprenticeships in England: Implementation Plan (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, BIS/13/1175 October 2013) 8. 
97 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Regulations Implementing the National Minimum Wage – a Report 
on the Apprentice Rate (Cm 9061, June 2015) 9. 
98 Ibid 6. 
99 Ibid 10. 
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In the research sample, however, the interplay between law and the informal norm led to 
unintended consequences due to differing valuations of labour. Farmers reported an intention to 
pay more than this statutory rate: 
His figure for college is £3.50 an hour, ok, on that apprenticeship. So, we found 
that a bit, bit – seemed a bit mean really, y’know, £3.50? I mean, there’s not a lot 
of people that aren’t worth 5 quid… We were going to give him £5, but then one of 
the lecturers said to us at the college ‘we’d rather you stuck at 3.50.’ 
                           (Mark, estate farm manager, aged 40-49) 
Mark explained that the college wanted parity across their students to deter comparisons, and 
arguments, at college. He was subsequently investing in his apprentice by sending him on training 
courses. Similarly, Xander’s young worker was hoping to attend an apprentice course, so the 
intended wage was reduced to the statutory level: 
I don’t want to pay him more then cut when he goes as an apprentice [laughs] so 
I’m paying him his apprentice rate now, and if he gets taken on the course then 
that will be all well and good.              (Xander, dairy farm owner, aged 50-59) 
Consequently, the legal standard is lower than the informal norm and has led to the worker being 
financially worse off. The apprentice rate is also not considered in isolation; it is intended to be, 
and appears considered by these employers, as the stepping stone to an ongoing working 
relationship: 
We don’t view it as cheap labour – we view it as training somebody for the industry. 
                      (Neil, dairy farm manager, aged 50-59) 
25 
 
However, due to the increases in other minimum wage rates, there is a large gap between 
apprentice rates and other minimum wages. As Mark commented; 
He’s on 3.50, and he needs to be on 8.10… I’m thinking yeah, he’s suddenly 130% 
more, so is he worth that?        
Mark thus questions his construction of labour’s value compared to the legislative standard. To 
reconcile the division, Mark intended to offer a 12-month contract after the apprenticeship to 
enable flexibility on both sides, although he admitted ‘it’s more safeguarding us than him, really.’ 
The informal norm to pay more than the statutory rate – for example, the £5 per hour that Mark, 
and others, suggested – would bridge the gap between rates but also seemingly provide more secure 
employment after the apprenticeship ends.   
 
The apprenticeship pay system is prescriptive, requiring a set pay rate with little ambiguity, and 
yet Edelman’s theorising also holds true as compliance was undertaken symbolically. 100 While 
formally the pay rules were met, farmers presented different opportunities in line with their sense 
of fairness. The informal norms thus continued to regulate the relationship. In addition, the 
concerns articulated by Mark undermine the standard of worker protection provided by the law, as 
farmers begin questioning their investments against the higher rates of NM/LW after the 
apprenticeship ends. As a result, the conflict between law and norms are reconciled101 by 
compliance with formal pay rates but balanced by insecure contracts. It thus appears that the law, 
while legitimised, places workers in a more precarious financial position.  
 
                                                          
100 Edelman (n 42) 1544. 
101 Ibid 1567. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
Discussions of informal norms and law tend to assume that the informal norm is a negative gloss 
to the law’s positive intention. As previous studies have shown, informal norms can fill the space 
that law leaves behind – either in its absence or because it is ignored – or shape law, particularly 
upon its introduction. In these instances, the implicit assumption is that compliance with norms 
over law is a negative occurrence. However in this research, the informal norm provided potential 
benefits for workers, over the legislative standard. 
 
Examining the statutory provisions on accommodation, pensions and apprenticeship pay revealed 
subtle interactions between the web of law and informal norms in working relationships. In this 
sample, norms were considered as an additional benefit, acceptable when aligned to other norms 
and more protective than the law. In each example, workers were seemingly financially more 
secure under the farmers’ informal valuation of their labour than the statutory level. In some 
instances, such as providing accommodation free of charge, this simply reflects the rules as 
statutory minima, where employers can offer better terms. In others, even when the law was 
effective in displacing the norm as with apprentice pay, subsequent considerations undermined the 
law’s protective capabilities. This impact of informal norms on the employment relationship thus 
requires further critical reflection, which focusing on the law as an analytical lens often fails to 
yield. Furthermore, this research queries the economic rational choice model as a basis for analysis 
as the actors it studied did not select options based solely on their own self-interest. While reduced 
staff availability may demand competitive wage-related benefits, decisions were still taken within 
the context of declining profits.  
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In the light of these findings, the interplay of informal norms and law within the employment 
relationship appears messy, or as Posner put it: ‘the effect of most laws on social behavior is so 
complex that a boundedly rational legislator could not predict it.’102 The task for this qualitative 
research has consequently not been one of prediction, but to question the often unidirectional gaze 
of scholarship that takes law as a positive analytic framework. Whilst the research discussed in 
this article is limited in its small-scale nature, and focused on employers, it does indicate that 
employers’ preference for norms can produce a beneficial outcome for workers. Consequently, 
while prediction is difficult, greater empirical understanding into the potential beneficial operation 
of informal norms prior to legislation’s enactment (even when legislating has been ‘successful’) 
could be a valuable policy endeavour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
102 Eric A. Posner, ‘Standards, Rules and Social Norms’ (1997) 21 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 101, 
112. 
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